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PAPERS
The Polder Model Reviewed:
Dutch Corporatism 1965–2000
Jaap Woldendorp and Hans Keman
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
The Dutch Polder Model gained international reputation in the 1990s
as an example of a successful and peaceful incomes management
policy while coping with severe pressure. This article claims that the
Polder Model has been overrated and so has its performance in terms
of consensus (central agreements). The article discusses the emergence
and working of this model in three parts. First, the behaviour of the
relevant actors (government, trade unions and employers’
organizations) during negotiations on incomes policy is examined.
The government employed more often than not a corporatist
strategy; however, the social partners did not comply and displayed
competitive behaviour. Second, the outcome of the negotiations in
terms of central agreements is analysed. The actual performance rate
is low due to ‘tough’ bargaining between social partners, and not all
central agreements were reached through a corporatist government
strategy. Finally, the dominance of social democracy in government
after 1994 did not increase the number of central agreements. This
research demonstrates that there is no typical or successful Dutch
Polder Model. Rather, the behaviour of the actors and related
performance are structured by macroeconomic circumstances and
exogenous inﬂuences.
Keywords: corporatism, incomes policy, labour relations, Polder Model,
the Netherlands
From Disease to Miracle?
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Dutch model of corporatist labour rela-
tions was considered a negative model beset by institutional sclerosis
and political stagnation, which produced the Dutch Disease.1 In the
late 1990s, almost overnight, Dutch corporatism became a positive
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model – the Polder Model (based on the Wassenaar Agreement of
December 1982 between trade unions and employers’ organizations)
– and the Dutch Miracle2 came about (Becker, 2001). The Nether-
lands became the envy of its neighbours. Political scientists and
economists diligently studied the country, looking for elements of
the model that could be exported to other countries and to the Euro-
pean Union (EU) in particular (Scharpf, 1997; Schmidt, V.A., 1997;
Jones, 1999; Labohm and Wijnker, 2000; Slomp, 2002; Falkner,
2003).
Recent events, however, have shown that despite the Polder
Model, the Dutch Miracle was apparently not sustainable. The
global contraction of economic growth in 2002 and 2003 also had
its negative impact on the Dutch economy. Both unemployment
and the budget deﬁcit again increased considerably. The ‘Miracle’
faded just as quickly as it emerged, and so too has the attraction
of the Polder Model (Delsen, 2002; van der Meer et al., 2003).
In this article, we investigate whether a Polder Model can be iden-
tiﬁed from three related angles that are discussed in the literature:
actors’ behaviour, central agreements3 and the participation of a
social democratic government (the Partij van de Arbeid [PvdA]).
In this literature it is argued that the cooperative behaviour of the
relevant actors involved in incomes policy enhances the performance
of Dutch corporatism in terms of central agreements, whereas the
participation of the PvdA in coalition government increases both
the likelihood of corporatist behaviour by government and trade
unions, as well as the number of central agreements (Woldendorp,
2005).
This Polder Model of cooperation, which is furthered by social
democratic government and results in central agreements (con-
sensus), is, then, taken as an explanation for the Dutch Miracle of
macroeconomic performance in the 1990s. We argue, instead, that
it was the macroeconomic and exogenous context that structured
the actors’ behaviour and was conducive to the performance of
that behaviour in terms of consensus (central agreements). In our
view, Dutch corporatism and its performance (central agreements)
varies over time, given the changing context in which party govern-
ment and social partners have to make their strategic choices.
To underline this empirically, we analyse Dutch corporatism and its
performance (consensus by central agreement) by examining annual
outcomes of negotiations on incomes policy in relation to party
government and social partners (see next section and Appendix).
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In this approach to Dutch corporatism (and its Polder Model
variety), we differ from other researchers, who tend to view Dutch
corporatism (and corporatism as a general phenomenon) as an
(independent) institutionalized and more or less constant feature
over time (but see Siaroff, 1999; Traxler, 2004; Vergunst, 2004)
that is indicated by consensus between party government and
social partners, and which explains macroeconomic performance
(see, for example, Schmidt, 1982; Alvarez et al., 1991; Western, 1991;
Cre´paz, 1992; Lijphart, 1999; Siaroff, 1999; Traxler and Kittel,
2000; Kenworthy, 2002).
Speciﬁcally discussing the Dutch Polder Model, Hartog (1999:
484), for instance, argues that Dutch corporatism means ‘consulta-
tion, co-ordination and bargaining over all important issues of
socio-economic policy between union federations, employer federa-
tions and the government’ (see also Teulings and Hartog, 1998).
Likewise, van Waarden (2002) considers that corporatism in the
Netherlands refers to a coordinated, concerted economy in which
social partners and the government cooperate in many policy
areas. Dutch corporatism is therefore considered to be stable due
to the high degree of institutionalized behaviour of the actors
involved.
Hogenboom and van Vliet (2000), economists working at the
Ministry of Economic Affairs, however, have a slightly different
appraisal of the Dutch Miracle and the Polder Model that appar-
ently produced it. The Polder Model consisted of a successful
combination of ﬁve government policy instruments cum goals.
From the early 1980s, government policy consistently aimed at
deﬁcit reduction, reduction of social security costs, wage modera-
tion, more competition and a stable currency. Eventually, this pro-
duced the economic recovery and job growth that constituted the
Dutch Miracle (see also van Sinderen, 2000; Stokman, 2000). And
many of those policies were implemented against heavy opposition
from sections of society, including trade unions and employers’
organizations (see also Gelauff, 2000).
Keman (2003) discusses the question whether the Polder Model
may be interpreted as a Dutch variety of the social democratic
‘Third Way’ with regard to active labour market policies. The
Dutch Polder Model appeared to be based on the government co-
alition between the PvdA and VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en
Democratie – Conservative Liberal Party) and D66 (Democraten 66
– Social Liberal Party) after 1994 and seemed to foster the ensuing
Woldendorp and Keman: The Polder Model Reviewed 319
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Dutch (employment) Miracle. Keman’s conclusion is that insti-
tutional cooperation and active labour market policies did indeed
produce more jobs. However, these were mainly part-time jobs for
young people and women, and job growth did not result in either
higher rates of employment or less ‘broad’ unemployment (i.e. regis-
tered unemployed and social security beneﬁciaries aged between 15
and 64). Comparatively, the Dutch (employment) Miracle consisted
of catching up with deindustrialization and a concomitant shift of
labour to new segments of the labour market.
To recapitulate, in our view Dutch corporatism – including its
Polder Model variety of close cooperation between government
and social partners in order to arrive at joint policy decisions (central
agreements) – is at best a favourable institutional arrangement to
develop and implement an incomes policy (see also Lehmbruch,
1979; Marks, 1986; Siaroff, 1999; Molina and Rhodes, 2002). The
macroeconomic and exogenous context structured the actors’ beha-
viour and determined its success (central agreements). In other
words, corporatism (and its policy-related performance: central
agreements) is a variable based on strategic choices of party govern-
ment and social partners and not a more or less static institutional
arrangement that fosters consensus (central agreements).
The structure of this article is as follows. In the ﬁrst section, the
behaviour of the relevant actors during annual negotiations on
incomes policy after 1965 is investigated. To analyse empirically
the behaviour of the actors, we devised a heuristic framework relat-
ing government strategies to styles of decision-making of trade
unions and employers’ organizations that can adequately capture
the behaviour and patterns of interaction that would constitute a
Polder Model (see Appendix). The next section deals with the out-
come of the annual negotiations on incomes policy in terms of
consensus. The issue is whether a Polder Model of corporatist
government strategies and cooperative styles of decision-making
(C) did indeed more often result in central agreements than corpora-
tist (or non-corporatist) government strategies combined with more
competitive styles of decision-making. Hence, we examine the
hypothesis ‘does corporatism matter?’ (Scharpf, 1987; Cre´paz, 1992;
Keman and Pennings, 1995). In the third section, we look at both
these issues from the point of view of social democratic government.
The question is whether social democracy in government in particu-
lar contributes both to the emergence of a Polder Model (behaviour)
as well as to more central agreements on incomes policy (perfor-
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mance or outcome). This hypothesis has been often put forward
since the 1980s (Cameron, 1984; Marks, 1986; Western, 1991;
Scharpf, 1991; Cre´paz, 1992). By way of conclusion, we offer an
alternative explanation: we claim that the behaviour of the actors,
as well as the outcome (central agreements), was mainly structured
by the macroeconomic (Disease or Miracle) and exogenous context
(European Monetary Union [EMU]4) that induced the government
to implement gradual institutional changes with regard to negotia-
tions on incomes policy. We hold that corporatism (including the
Polder Model variety) should be understood as an intervening
rather than an effect-producing variable when analysing the process
of incomes policy formation in the Netherlands. The explanatory
power of corporatism appears to be much weaker than is often
assumed in the literature.
Managing Conﬂict in the Dutch Polder Model: Actors’ Behaviour
The heuristic framework to capture the behaviour of the actors iden-
tiﬁes four government strategies and three styles of decision-making,
which are elaborated extensively in the Appendix. The four govern-
ment strategies are the passive strategy (I – non-corporatist), the
cooperative strategy (II – corporatist), the congruent strategy (III
– corporatist) and the guiding strategy (IV – non-corporatist). The
three styles of decision-making of social partners are confrontation
(A), bargaining (B) and problem-solving (C). A Polder Model
version of Dutch corporatism, which emphasizes cooperation
between the three actors, should, in terms of our heuristic frame-
work, be characterized by a combination of a corporatist govern-
ment strategy (either cooperative – II – or congruent – III) and a
cooperative, problem-solving style of decision-making (C) between
trade unions and employers’ organizations (see Appendix).5 In the
Polder Model, social partners are expected to cooperate with each
other, while the government is expected to support and facilitate
this cooperation, in order to reach a collective outcome that is
embodied in a central agreement. Hence, achieving a central agree-
ment reﬂects the successful working of Dutch corporatism in general
and of the Polder Model variation in particular (see next section).
Empirical analysis of opening and concluding government strate-
gies and styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’
organizations6 after 1965 (Table A1) shows that in 23 of the
Woldendorp and Keman: The Polder Model Reviewed 321
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36 years investigated (63.9 percent) the government started by
adopting a corporatist strategy in its involvement in the annual
negotiations on incomes policy. Social partners, however, over-
whelmingly chose to conduct a competitive style of decision-
making (confrontation or bargaining) in 33 of the 36 years
(81.7 percent). In other words: whereas in a majority of the period
investigated the government tried to facilitate cooperation between
social partners, with two exceptions (1970, 1990) social partners
behaved competitively, putting their own preferences ﬁrst. From
the perspective of opening government strategies and styles of
decision-making, the behaviour identiﬁed did not correspond to
the idea underlying the Polder Model.
Looking subsequently at concluding government strategies and
styles of decision-making, we can observe some change. Govern-
ments ended negotiations on incomes policy less frequently with a
corporatist strategy in 19 of the 36 years (52.8 percent), whereas
social partners ended slightly more often with a cooperative
(problem-solving) style of decision-making in ﬁve of the 36 years
(13.9 percent). The government continued to try to facilitate co-
operation between social partners until the end of negotiations,
but with two exceptions (1994, 1999) social partners stuck to a
competitive mode of behaviour.
However, the distribution of concluding corporatist government
strategies over time is quite skewed. Before 1987, non-corporatist
government strategies were dominant: in 16 out of 22 years
(72.8 percent); whereas after 1986, corporatist strategies were domi-
nant: 13 out of 14 years (92.6 percent). Conversely the social
partners stuck to their competitive behaviour until the very end of
negotiations, putting their own preferences ﬁrst almost all the
time. From the perspective of concluding government strategies
and styles of decision-making of social partners the Polder Model
cannot be identiﬁed either. Although concluding government strate-
gies were overwhelmingly corporatist from 1987, social partners did
not respond with a cooperative (problem-solving) style of decision-
making.
The questions are: Why? And, what made many students of cor-
poratism believe in the Polder Model? We argue that the behaviour
of all actors involved can be better understood by taking into
account the macroeconomic and exogenous variables that induced
the government to effect institutional changes with respect to nego-
tiations on incomes policy (Table 1). We also suggest that too many
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students of Dutch politics and policy-making appear to have fallen
foul of an ecological fallacy: drawing conclusions from a contempor-
ary point of view instead of systematically developing an empirically
grounded historical account, as well as leaving aside the socio-
economic context in which the negotiations on incomes policy
took place.
As is shown in Table 1, in the 1960s and the early 1970s, within a
positive macroeconomic context, the search is on for a new system of
free7 central negotiations on incomes policy. The concluding non-
corporatist government strategy went back and forth between the
guiding and the passive strategy. Trade unions and employers’ orga-
nizations had some difﬁculty adjusting to the new situation after the
demise of the centralized, government-directed incomes policy.
Their inability to reach agreements reinforced the habitual tendency
of governments of all persuasions to take over again the determina-
tion of incomes policy as they were used and authorized to do from
1945 until 1965. The government retained that authority in the new
Law on Wage Formation of 1970 as well. Only reluctantly did
governments refrain from intervention in the formation and imple-
mentation of incomes policy to give trade unions and employers’
organizations a chance to come to an agreement. Government and
social partners clearly played a different game. Or alternatively,
the social partners did not always or only hesitantly abide by the
rules the politicians attempted to set for the (only) game in town
and that increased unstable relations between actors.
In the mid-1970s, the aim of the government’s corporatist strate-
gies was to bring trade unions and employers’ organizations to
conclude central agreements in order to overcome the negative
macroeconomic effects of the oil crisis of 1973 (see Table 1). When
these attempts proved unsuccessful, the government took over
incomes policy with a non-corporatist guiding strategy. In view of
external shocks, the government did not continue to play a co-
operative game: public authority transformed it towards zero-sum
solutions.
In the ﬁrst half of the 1980s, the concluding non-corporatist guid-
ing strategy conducted by government was dominant between 1980
and 1982, and the passive strategy prevailed from 1983 to 1986.
Between 1980 and 1982, the macroeconomic situation gradually
worsened, especially after the second oil crisis of 1979/80, intensify-
ing the Dutch Disease (see Table 1). Incomes policy from 1980 to
1982 was determined by government policy aimed at a reduction
324 Economic and Industrial Democracy 28(3)
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of the rapidly increasing budget deﬁcit. To that effect, incomes
policy in the market sector had to result in moderation. Because
of all the linking mechanisms between the market sector and the
(semi-) public sector,8 a moderate incomes policy in the market
sector made it more feasible to achieve moderation in the (semi-)
public sector as well. This, in turn, would contribute to a reduction
of the rate of increase of the deﬁcit. From 1980 to 1982, trade unions
and employers’ organizations were unable to reach any central
agreement, although they came quite close in 1980. The main
obstacle was their widely differing views on how to tackle the eco-
nomic problems that resulted in growing unemployment, rising
social security transfers and climbing budget deﬁcits. Neither party
was prepared to give an inch on the issue of incomes, despite efforts
by the government. Consequently, to reach its objective of a reduc-
tion in the rate of increase of deﬁcit spending and public debt,
government largely took over responsibility for incomes policy in
these years (den Butter and Mosch, 2003). Again, it ought to be
noticed that while the social partners chose competitive behaviour,
it was the government that switched towards a passive or an inter-
ventionist strategy. Hence, the degree of corporatist intermediation
was limited and usually unsuccessful.
From 1983, based on the bipartite Wassenaar Agreement of
December 1982 in the market sector (see later), the government
had effectively severed all linking mechanisms between wages in
the market sector and wages and beneﬁts in the (semi-) public
sector. Both sectors were only relinked partially and on an ad hoc
basis in the 1990s, within the context of the preparation for the
EMU in 1999. Consequently, the incentive for the government to
intervene with binding policy measures in negotiations on incomes
policy in the market sector was greatly reduced after 1983, despite
the continuing Dutch Disease (see Table 1). In other words, due to
former stalemate situations and economic stagnation the inter-
actions and related behaviour changed in the 1980s. The govern-
ment’s main preoccupation in those years was the reduction of
government expenditure and the budget deﬁcit by reducing the
(semi-) public sector. Incomes policy in the market sector was largely
left to social partners (Hemerijck, 2003).
After 1986, governments did not revert to the non-corporatist
guiding strategy when agreement proved difﬁcult. In part this was
due to the amendment of the Law on Wage Formation. From
1987 onwards, government intervention in incomes policy in the
Woldendorp and Keman: The Polder Model Reviewed 325
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market sector was only feasible in the case of a national emergency
caused by external factors.9 Trade unions and employers’ organiza-
tions now had ample room to manoeuvre to pursue their interests in
the market sector. However, because the market sector was effec-
tively severed from the (semi-) public sector by the government
since 1983 and only relinked ad hoc and on a partial basis in the
1990s (depending on macroeconomic performance), disagreement
between social partners in the market sector did not have the same
detrimental effects on the government budget as it had in the late
1970s and early 1980s. Even if the government’s corporatist strategy
was not successful in bringing social partners to an agreement in the
market sector, government did not feel the urge to intervene in
incomes policy with binding policy measures to prevent a negative
spillover to the (semi-) public sector. And after 1995, economic
growth and the restructuration of the labour market that resulted
in the Dutch Miracle (see Table 1) made it easier for the government
to reach the EMU targets.
Obviously, both ﬁscal and macroeconomic developments did play
a role and enabled the government’s preference to pursue a conclud-
ing corporatist strategy. It is not the behaviour of the actors that
appears crucial but rather the circumstances that made consensual
behaviour possible. In particular, the reduction of regulatory
constraints by the government (delinkage and the Law of 1987)
helped to reduce the need for binding intervention in the case of
disagreement between social partners. From this point of view the
Polder Model is not so much a new type of corporatism (as, for
instance, Visser and Hemerijck [1997] claim), but rather a form of
neoliberal governance (Molina and Rhodes, 2002). All three actors
took up new roles and seemingly adjusted their behaviour accord-
ingly. This change of game is – in our view mistakenly – labelled
the Polder Model.
The Role and Importance of Central Agreements in Dutch
Corporatism
In this section, we explore the performance of Dutch corporatism
and in particular of the Polder Model in terms of consensus by
examining the relationship between government strategies, styles
of decision-making and central agreements. Recall that unlike
other students of corporatism we view corporatism, including the
326 Economic and Industrial Democracy 28(3)
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Dutch Polder Model and its policy-related performance – consensus
indicated by central agreements – as varying over time due to the
strategic behavioural choices made by party government and social
partners instead of a more or less static institutional arrangement
that fosters consensus (central agreements). Corporatist outcomes
are therefore deﬁned as those outcomes in which the government
seeks to facilitate trade unions and employers’ organizations to
achieve a ‘structure induced equilibrium’ or in the Dutch case, a
central agreement (Shepsle, 1995: 283–4). Corporatist outcomes are
characterized by corporatist government strategies (cooperative and
congruent) in combination with the bargaining (B) and problem-
solving (C) styles of decision-making of social partners. The Polder
Model outcomes refer to the combination of both corporatist
government strategies and the problem-solving (C) style of decision-
making (see Appendix).
The substance of the outcome can be explained in terms of a
reordering of the lists of needs of each actor as expressed in their
respective agendas. The government is the pivotal actor in this
corporatist process of reordering (Keman, 1999: 262–5; see also
Katzenstein, 1985). In the corporatist arena, all actors usually
have comparable lists of needs and interests. But almost by deﬁni-
tion, these needs and interests differ in the importance attached to
them by the actors involved. And usually trade unions and employ-
ers’ organizations have quite conﬂicting ranking orders. This implies
that government has to mediate and to encourage the occurrence of
viable agreements (compromises acceptable to all). At the same time,
the government itself is also an actor with a comparable list of
interests in a certain ranking order. To reach agreement between
all three actors, it will be necessary to try and reorder each actor’s
list of interests on the basis of potentially shared interests. In the pro-
cess of consultation and negotiation, with all corresponding con-
ﬂicts, it becomes clear whether or not this reordering may occur
and an agreement (compromise) can be reached, sanctioned by
parliament.
Corporatist government strategies were indeed more successful in
reordering actors’ preferences than non-corporatist strategies.
Nevertheless, only in a minority of 14 of the 36 years (38.9 percent)
under review was a central agreement reached and only two of these
cases represent the Polder Model. Finally, in three of these 14 years
government strategy was of the non-corporatist variety (Table A1).
This result is somewhat surprising. Although no Polder Model could
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be identiﬁed from the perspective of government strategies and styles
of decision-making, in quite a few years we can identify a ‘structure-
induced equilibrium’ or central agreement. The relation between a
Polder Model and central agreements is apparently less straight-
forward than usually claimed. A corporatist government strategy
(a prerequisite for the Polder Model) can lead to a central agree-
ment, despite competitive instead of problem-solving (Polder
Model) behaviour on the part of the social partners, whereas in some
cases a non-corporatist government strategy may induce social
partners to a cooperative (problem-solving) style of decision-making
that results in a central agreement as well. Our ﬁndings clearly indi-
cate that Dutch corporatism indeed varies over time. It is not a
highly institutionalized policy arrangement that is constant and
effective (central agreements) over time (as, for example, van
Waarden [2002], Hemerijck [2003] and den Butter and Mosch [2003]
have put forward).
The distribution of concluding corporatist government strategies
is skewed, and so is the distribution of central agreements. Between
1965 and 1987, only ﬁve central agreements could be identiﬁed, three
of which were associated with non-corporatist government strategies
combined with cooperative (problem-solving – C) behaviour of
social partners. From 1987, nine central agreements could be identi-
ﬁed. Seven of these central agreements were associated with corpora-
tist government strategies combined with the competitive,
bargaining style of decision-making (B), and two with the Polder
Model problem-solving style of decision-making (C). This signiﬁes
in our view that central agreements in the Netherlands were usually
reached through more or less ‘tough’ bargaining between social
partners, supported, facilitated or resolved by the government.
Corporatist government strategies resulted in more central agree-
ments than non-corporatist strategies, but reaching a central agree-
ment was not related with cooperative (problem-solving) behaviour
of social partners, i.e. the Polder Model.
The inability to reach a central agreement despite a corporatist
government strategy, on the other hand, was directly related to the
(competitive) behaviour of social partners. This was the case in
eight annual rounds of negations between 1965 and 2000 (Wolden-
dorp, 2005: 149ff.). As has been elaborated, the crucial issue has
been how the negotiations were conducted by government, and to
what extent the economic situation allowed government to play a
mediating role in reordering the agenda for ﬁnding an equilibrium.
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What we observe is that with great difﬁculty and by making major
concessions to both trade unions and employers’ organizations, the
government succeeded in 1973 in getting social partners to conclude
a bipartite central agreement on incomes policy at the central level.
It was a classical case of reordering or compensating preferences
based on each actor’s agenda, at least at the central, national
level. However, implementation of the agreement on the decentral
level led to conﬂicts and a number of strikes. The explanation for
the failed central agreement is that the successful reordering at the
national level ran into difﬁculties with the rank and ﬁle of the
national organizations during implementation. Although social
partners at the national level had agreed to a reordering of prefer-
ences, arranged by the government’s corporatist strategy, they
could not deliver at the decentral level.
In 1975, 1978 and 1979, the government’s policy packages were all
aimed at enticing social partners to conclude a central agreement to
counter the macroeconomic effects of the 1973 oil crisis. One or both
social partners refused to consider a central agreement based on
these policy packages as they were unwilling to compromise on
the issues of incomes policy and felt that these policy packages
were insufﬁcient. That governments continued their corporatist
strategies despite this lack of cooperation and did not implement a
non-corporatist binding strategy again, was due to their efforts to
patch up relations with social partners (especially the trade
unions) after their binding (crisis) interventions in 1974 and 1976.
Furthermore, in 1979 there was a change of government. The incom-
ing government did not want to sour its relations with the trade
unions immediately after it had come to power. The other, non-
corporatist, passive strategy was no option either, given the
combined detrimental effects of the oil crisis and the linkage of
macroeconomic performance and the government’s budget.
In 1988, 1989 and 1995 negotiations again did not result in a
central agreement. The differences between the preferences of
social partners could not be bridged by the government’s policy
packages. As the government could no longer intervene with the
non-corporatist guiding strategy because of the new Law on Wage
Formation of 1987, and the market sector and the (semi-) public
sector remained delinked, it chose to keep social partners at least
involved in central consultations with a corporatist strategy.
In 2000, neither party argued for a central agreement. Decentral
negotiations proceeded without much difﬁculty due to a booming
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economy and a government policy that boosted buying power of
the lower paid and included a partial linkage between the market
sector and the (semi-) public sector. The explanation for the failed
central agreement is that within the context of a booming economy
no actor desired a central agreement as no actor felt the urge for
coordination.
Summing up, the ineffectiveness of corporatist government strate-
gies was due to the (competitive) behaviour of one or both of the
social partners. A corporatist government strategy was only effective
if both social partners were willing to negotiate a reordering of their
preferences. In the eight years discussed that was not the case, as
social partners were more or less captured by their constituencies,
on the one hand, and by economic circumstances and EMU require-
ments, on the other. Reaching central agreements or not is – in retro-
spect – therefore, not simply a matter of corporatist behaviour or
choosing the right strategy alone but foremost a delicate interplay
of these factors and contextual circumstances.
The three central agreements that were associated with a non-
corporatist government strategy combined with a cooperative
(problem-solving) style of decision-making of social partners were
an expression of the leading role of the government in negotiations
on incomes policy under the condition of an institutional linkage
between the market sector and the (semi-) public sector. In 1970,
in the context of a positive macroeconomic performance; in 1983
and 1984 in the context of a negative macroeconomic performance
that led to the Dutch Disease. In 1970, negotiations on incomes
policy between social partners proceeded smoothly and, aided by
an initial corporatist strategy of the government, resulted in a bipar-
tite central agreement – a classical case of reordering or compensat-
ing preferences by the government, based on the actors’ agendas.
But trade unions and the government collided head-on about the
new Law on Wage Formation. Trade unions were reluctantly sup-
ported by employers’ organizations. In response, the government
unilaterally intervened in the agreement on the price indexation
that was the cornerstone of the bipartite central agreement, and
ended its involvement in incomes policy with adoption of the non-
corporatist guiding strategy. The explanation for this rather
unexpected outcome is that the central agreement was based on the
initial combination of strategy and style of decision-making. The
non-corporatist strategywithwhichthegovernmentended its involve-
ment in incomes policy was the result of a conﬂict between social
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partners and the government about the future of negotiations on
incomes policy that spilled over to the substance of incomes policy
in 1970. With its concluding non-corporatist strategy, the govern-
ment made it quite clear that it intended to remain the pivotal
actor in negotiations on incomes policy.
In 1983 and 1984, central agreements were struck and the govern-
ment’s concluding strategy was the non-corporatist, passive strategy.
These two years were both covered by the famous central Wassenaar
Agreement of December 1982. For 1983, under strong pressure from
the incoming government, trade unions and employers’ organiza-
tions succeeded in striking a deal. The bipartite Wassenaar Agree-
ment involved an exchange of the automatic price indexation for a
reduction in working hours and the creation of part-time jobs in
the market sector. When after the initial agreement, decentral nego-
tiations on the exchange proceeded too slowly for the government’s
liking, it again threatened to intervene with binding measures. That
induced trade unions and employers’ organizations to conclude
more decentral agreements based on the central Wassenaar Agree-
ment. These collective agreements covered 1983 and 1984. In
response, government refrained from any further intervention in
the market sector and concentrated its own policy efforts on the
(semi-) public sector. All linking mechanisms were put on hold in
1983, and in 1984 wages, pensions and beneﬁts were cut to reduce
the growing budget deﬁcit and public debt (Dutch Disease).
The Wassenaar Agreement is a peculiar central agreement. It was
not the result of a government policy that enabled social partners to
reorder or compensate their preferences. On the contrary, the
Wassenaar Agreement was the result of a threat by the government
that it would continue to completely determine incomes policy as it
had done in 1980, 1981 and 1982 if no agreement in the market
sector was reached. The government’s message to social partners
was, in effect: come to an agreement or become obsolete with respect
to incomes policy in the market sector. And despite their continued
differences of opinion, after the three years 1980–82, social partners
indeed favoured a bipartite agreement on incomes policy in the
market sector more than the continuation of a completely govern-
ment-directed incomes policy in that sector that made them redun-
dant. Incomes policy in the (semi-) public sector, however,
remained ﬁrmly under government control, despite heavy opposi-
tion by the trade unions. If the Wassenaar Agreement of 1983 is
to be taken as the start of a Polder Model, it was a model forced
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on social partners by the government. The model also applied only
to the market sector. Incomes policy in the (semi-) public sector was
completely under government control.
In conclusion, although reaching a central agreement can be asso-
ciated with a corporatist government strategy aimed at reordering
the actors’ preferences, in particular after 1987, it should be recog-
nized that the success of that strategy depended on the behaviour
of social partners. If social partners were not willing to negotiate a
reordering of their preferences, no central agreement could be
reached. A successful reordering usually involved some ‘tough’
bargaining between social partners and between social partners
and the government. It was not dependent on cooperative, Polder
Model behaviour of social partners. The macroeconomic and exo-
genous context clearly had an impact on the outcome of negotiations
– in particular under the conditions of reduced regulatory strains
effected by the government: delinkage in the 1980s, the Law of
1987 and the ad hoc relinkage in the 1990s. This reinforces our con-
tention that Dutch corporatism indeed varies instead of representing
an institutionalized and constant policy arrangement over time that
habitually produces consensus (central agreements). Our research
suggests that Dutch corporatism, including the Polder Model
variety, was more effective when (external and institutional) condi-
tions were more favourable; neither cooperative behaviour of social
partners nor government per se could produce these favourable
conditions.
Social Democracy in Coalition Government: Does it Make a
Difference?
Comparative research claims a strong relation between corporatism
and social democratic government (Cameron, 1984; Marks, 1986;
Western, 1991; Cre´paz, 1992). For the Dutch case, however, the
link between corporatism and social democratic government is
more complex. In the Netherlands, the PvdA has always been part
of coalition governments when in government. After 1965, when
the PvdA was in government, the party either governed with the
CDA (Christen Democratisch Appe`l – Christian Democratic
Party) or its precursors, or with the VVD and D66. Until 1994,
the CDA was usually both the median and largest party in parlia-
ment and was always included in government (Laver and Schoﬁeld,
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1998). It was the pivotal party dominating the centre space in the
Dutch party system (Keman, 1997, 2002; van Kersbergen, 1997,
1999). In 1995, the PvdA took over the position as largest party in
government and parliament from the CDA, but the CDA remained
the central or median party. In other words, for the major part of
the period after 1965, Dutch corporatism would appear not to be
the product of social democracy per se, but rather of Christian
democratic (participation in) government with or without social
democracy.
As in most systems with coalition governments, the distribution of
portfolios in Dutch coalition governments is largely proportional
to the respective party’s seats in parliament. With respect to the
ministries claimed by respective coalition parties, the largest party
usually takes the post of prime minister (PM). When in coalition
with either the PvdA or the VVD, the CDA, or its precursors,
usually took the portfolio of Social Affairs (which includes Labour),
the ministry directly responsible for incomes policy. It was only in
the coalition after 1994 with the VVD and D66, that the PvdA
became the dominant party in government and held both the
ofﬁce of PM and the Ministry of Social Affairs (Woldendorp et
al., 2000: 395–401).
This means that research into a relation between corporatist
government strategies and social democratic government in the
Netherlands (and comparable party systems like, for example,
Belgium, Finland and Austria) is faced with a difﬁculty. The inter-
national literature clearly argues that corporatism goes together
with social democratic (dominance in) government. In the Dutch
case, that is only more or less the case for the coalitions after
1994. In coalition governments before 1995, the CDA was the domi-
nant party in government and the party primarily responsible for
incomes policy (see also Lijphart and Cre´paz, 1991). Therefore, in
the Netherlands, the conditions governing international research
into the relation between social democracy and corporatism in fact
only apply to the years after 1994, and even then not completely.
Taking this into account, we conduct our discussion of the pos-
sible relation between a corporatist government strategy and the
PvdA in government in two stages. First, we establish whether
government participation of the PvdA as such and corporatist
government strategies indeed go together. Next, we investigate
whether or not there is a difference with regard to corporatist
government strategies between coalition governments with the
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PvdA before and after 1994. In other words, does social democracy
matter for the Polder Model?
Based on the international literature, we expect that coalition
governments in which the PvdA participated concluded their
involvement in incomes policy more often with a corporatist govern-
ment strategy than coalition governments in which the PvdA did not
participate. We also expect that after 1994, coalition governments in
which the PvdA participated and held both the ofﬁce of PM and
Minister of Social Affairs more often employed a corporatist
government strategy than coalition governments with the PvdA
prior to 1995.
Finally, we discuss the outcome of incomes policy of coalition
governments with and without participation of the PvdA in terms
of central agreements. In the preceding sections, we have established
that corporatist government strategies more often resulted in a
central agreement than non-corporatist government strategies.
Consequently, we expect coalition governments in which the PvdA
participated to reach more central agreements than coalition
governments in which the PvdA did not participate. Furthermore,
we expect coalition governments in which the PvdA participated
after 1994 to do even better.
Before 1995, the PvdA participated in coalition government in 11
of the 30 years (36.7 percent), and after 1994 in all six years investi-
gated (Table A1). In seven of the 11 years (63.6 percent) before 1995,
the government concluded its involvement in incomes policy with a
corporatist government strategy, whereas after 1994, when the PvdA
was the dominant party in government and held the Ministry of
Social Affairs, the government did so in all years. Governments in
which the PvdA did not participate show the opposite pattern of
concluding government strategies. Those governments ended their
involvement in incomes policy with a corporatist strategy in only
six of the 19 years (31.6 percent). A corporatist government strategy
indeed coincided with the participation of the PvdA in government.
This ﬁnding concurs with international research on the relation
between corporatism and social democracy in government. More-
over, that relation was strongest when the PvdA was both the domi-
nant party in government and held the ofﬁce of Minister of Social
Affairs.
However, there were exceptions to this pattern. How to account
for this? We see two factors that inﬂuence these deviations: one,
institutional changes put forward by government led to negative
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responses either by one or two of the social actors. Two, macro-
economic circumstances (affecting Dutch macroeconomic perfor-
mance or the ﬁscal context) inﬂuenced the room for manoeuvre
for government and apparently limited the ﬂexibility of the social
partners to ﬁnd an equilibrium position (Keman, 1999; Scharpf,
2001).
These factors can account for concluding non-corporatist strate-
gies employed by coalition governments in which the PvdA partici-
pated but was not the dominant party (Woldendorp, 2005: 188ff.).
In all four years, social partners could either not come to an agree-
ment at the central level, or did not want to negotiate at the central
level. In 1966, the government reacted by reverting to the trusted
pattern of the centrally guided incomes policy and took over respon-
sibility for incomes policy. In 1974 and 1976, the government also
reacted by taking over incomes policy, but this time it was an emer-
gency policy to boost the economy in order to counter the negative
macroeconomic effects of the 1973 oil crisis. Last, in 1992, the
government remained passive with regard to incomes policy in the
market sector because there was no threat of a spillover from that
sector to the (semi-) public sector.
This indicates that it was indeed mainly external circumstances
(the change from a government-guided incomes policy to a ‘free’
incomes policy in 1966 that was driven by economic growth; the
macroeconomic effects of the 1973 oil crisis in 1974 and 1976; and
the delinkage of the market sector from the (semi-) public sector
in 1992 that was instituted in 1983 and 1984 to counter the effects
of the severe economic crisis in the 1980s – Dutch Disease) that
accounted for the actors’ behaviour.
Concluding corporatist government strategies of coalition govern-
ments in which the PvdA did not participate can also be explained
by these factors (Woldendorp, 2005: 190ff.). In 1965, government
and social partners conducted a classical corporatist reordering of
needs that resulted in a central agreement brokered by the govern-
ment. In 1973, that was also the case, but in this year, the rank
and ﬁle of social partners failed to deliver on the decentral levels.
That the government stuck to its corporatist strategy was due to
its outgoing status. In 1979, all efforts of the government to reach
a central agreement foundered on the unwillingness of trade
unions to compromise on an incomes policy based on the govern-
ment’s policy programme. The incoming government did not want
to jeopardize its relation with trade unions and refrained from
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implementing a non-corporatist government strategy. From 1987 to
1989, all efforts of the government to reach a central agreement
succeeded only in 1987. That the government nevertheless stuck to
its corporatist government strategy in 1988 and 1989 can be
explained by the continued delinkage of the market sector and the
(semi-) public sector, in combination with the new Law on Wage
Formation of 1987.
Finally, can participation of the PvdA as the dominant party in
government after 1994 account for the emergence of a new, or
more effective Polder Model in terms of central agreements? The
answer is: no. We have elaborated that participation of the PvdA
in coalition government did lead to more concluding corporatist
government strategies, particularly after 1994. We have also elabo-
rated that concluding corporatist government strategies more
often led to central agreements than non-corporatist government
strategies. Before 1995, coalition governments in which the PvdA
participated reached a central agreement in ﬁve of the seven years
(71.4 percent) that these governments concluded their involvement
in incomes policy with a corporatist government strategy. After
1994, that was the case in four of the six years (66.7 percent).
In both periods, only one central agreement was reached by a
Polder Model combination of corporatist government strategy and
problem-solving style of decision-making of social partners. Clearly,
participation of the PvdA as the dominant party in coalition govern-
ment after 1994 did not produce a new, or a more successful Polder
Model in terms of central agreements.
In conclusion, the role of social democracy has been important
and more accommodating for corporatism compared to other par-
ties. However, its role as government party in relation to producing
cooperative, problem-solving behaviour of social partners or achiev-
ing a central agreement should not be overestimated. Unlike other
authors, we argue that social democracy is not a necessary central
actor to make corporatist intermediation work in the Netherlands.
Conclusion: There Was No Polder Model and Dutch Corporatism
Varies over Time
In this article, we have argued that a Polder Model that emphasizes
cooperation between social partners must be located in the coopera-
tive, problem-solving style of decision-making. In addition, govern-
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ment strategy must be corporatist as it is supposed to support or
facilitate this cooperation to make the Polder Model work, i.e.
result in central agreements. We have concluded that there is
hardly any evidence to support the emergence and existence of
such a Polder Model in the Netherlands as a structural feature –
neither after 1987, nor in the 1990s. Although concluding corpora-
tist government strategies did increase considerably after 1987, the
main concluding style of decision-making of both trade unions
and employers’ organizations remained the competitive bargaining
style (B). Dutch corporatism was typically a combination of the
cooperative corporatist government strategy (II) and the competi-
tive bargaining style of decision-making (B). Despite the fact that
governments attempted time and again to develop cooperation by
means of consensual policies, the preferences of the social partners
remained the central focus during negotiations on incomes policy.
In our view, this does not represent a typical Polder Model as
discussed in the literature.
The emergence of a Polder Model was also analysed from the
perspective of central agreements. The Polder Model is assumed to
foster agreements between social partners and between social part-
ners and the government. After 1987, the number of central agree-
ments was indeed considerably higher than before. However,
central agreements were not all based on concluding corporatist
government strategies and neither did all concluding corporatist
government strategies result in central agreements. Besides, only
two of the 14 central agreements between 1965 and 2000 were
based on the cooperative problem-solving style of decision-making
(C) of social partners. Hence the relation between a Polder Model
and the eventual result in central agreements remains very weak.
The emergence of a Polder Model was ﬁnally analysed from the
perspective of government participation of the PvdA. The stronger
position of the PvdA in government after 1994 did not produce a
new, or a more effective Polder Model either.
Our research ﬁndings also imply that the importance that
researchers have attached to theWassenaar Agreement of December
1982 is overrated. The Wassenaar Agreement cannot be considered
as a watershed. Corporatism did exist in the Netherlands between
1965 and 2000, but it has always varied; it was not a constant
factor with a predictable outcome. It varied both in occurrence
and in performance (central agreements). That variation, however,
did not constitute a new Polder Model in the 1990s. Negotiations
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on incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 sometimes resulted in
central agreements, sometimes they did not, depending on macro-
economic developments (Disease or Miracle) and the exogenous
context (EMU requirements), which inﬂuenced the actors’ beha-
viour and sometimes led to changes in the institutional arrangements
effected by the government (from a government guided to a free
incomes policy, to linkage, delinkage, then relinkage), which then
in turn inﬂuenced the actors’ behaviour. In short, neither corporat-
ism nor social democracy in government is decisive in directing or
explaining Dutch incomes policy. The explanatory power of both
is much weaker than usually assumed in the literature.
We argue that Dutch corporatism can be better understood as
(literally) ‘muddling through’ by actors caught up in self-interested
behaviour under circumstances that limit (or increase) their room
to manoeuvre. Those who see successful (social democratic) govern-
ment, or those that stress a change in attitude of social partners miss
this crucial point. The Dutch play ‘pluralism’ as a game but the
degrees of freedom are limited by macroeconomic and other exo-
genous circumstances. There is no Polder Model. Corporatism in
the Netherlands varies over time and incomes policy agreements in
the Netherlands are contingent on the macroeconomic and exogen-
ous context.
Appendix
In this study we use a classiﬁcation of corporatist intermediation
between government and the (recognized) social partners (employers’
organizations and trade union federations) in the Netherlands that is
derived from an extensive study by Woldendorp (2005). The basic
structure is to relate governmental strategy with respect to incomes
policy concertation to styles of decision-making pursued by social
actors. Four options of government involvement and three styles
of decision-making are distinguished.
Government Strategy
I ¼ Passive strategy (non-corporatist): the government remains
passive and abstains from any intervention in the negotiations
between trade unions and employers’ organizations (formation).
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The government does not intervene in the outcome of the negotia-
tions (implementation).
II ¼ Cooperative strategy (corporatist): the government restricts
its interventions to the facilitation of negotiations between trade
unions and employers’ organizations (formation). Government
either does not intervene in the outcome of the negotiations, or
the intervention does not go against the trend of the outcome of
those negotiations (implementation).
III ¼ Congruent strategy (corporatist): the government actively
intervenes with its own policy proposals in the negotiations between
trade unions and employers’ organizations. The government’s inter-
ventions are aimed at facilitating agreement between all three actors
involved by formulating a policy package that can potentially
accommodate all ( formation). The government may intervene
in the outcome of the negotiations with its own policy proposals
with respect to wages, taxes and social security premiums and bene-
ﬁts, but without going against the outcome of the negotiations
between government, trade unions and employers’ organizations
(implementation).
IV ¼ Guiding strategy (non-corporatist): the government puts its
own agenda ﬁrst. Trade unions and employers’ organizations are
compelled to accept the government’s agenda as the basis for
incomes policy. The government basically implements its own
policy with respect to wages, taxes and social security premiums
and beneﬁts without much regard for the agendas of the ‘social
partners’ or the outcomes of the negotiations (formation and
implementation).
Style of Decision-Making of Social Partners
A ¼ Confrontation: the agendas of trade unions and employers’
organizations differ substantially. There is hardly any common
ground to reach agreement. Negotiations may be characterized by
defection (from negotiations) and open conﬂicts (like strikes, lock-
outs and the like) between trade unions and employers’ organiza-
tions. Both actors put their own (self-) interest ﬁrst.
B ¼ Bargaining: the agendas of trade unions and employers’
organizations feature the same issues and concerns, but with differ-
ing emphases with regard to desired solutions and policies. Negotia-
tions may be protracted, quite conﬂictual, and result in deadlocks.
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Parties may threaten to defect, but will avoid actual defection. Both
actors’ rational interests make it difﬁcult to come to an agreement.
C ¼ Problem-solving: the agendas of trade unions and employers’
organizations feature the same issues and concerns and share
enough common ground with regard to desired solutions and poli-
cies that there is a basis for exchange and compromise. Negotiations
may nevertheless be characterized by temporary deadlocks or even
long duration, but parties will continue to strive for the best joint
optimal outcome. Both actors have one or more shared interests
that induce them to come to an agreement.
Government’s fourfold strategy involves two choices: corporatist
involvement in incomes policy or not, and active or passive. The
styles of decision-making can be understood in game-theoretic
terms and are derived from Scharpf (1998: 54–7; see also Scharpf,
1987). Confrontation represents ‘conﬂict’ with little room for agree-
ment (A). Bargaining is based on self-interested behaviour; however,
with a possible outcome that represents an equilibrium (B). Finally,
problem-solving is a different game; here we assume that actors have
an eye for the collective outcome (C).
Using the operationalization of government strategies and styles
of decision-making listed here, an in-depth investigation of 36
annual rounds of negotiations on the formation and implementation
of incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 was conducted. This inves-
tigation represents a consecutive series of case studies based on
‘thick’ description. The behaviour of all three actors during negotia-
tions (as well as the outcome: central agreements) was classiﬁed in
terms of strategies and styles of decision-making from start to
ﬁnish. It should be noted that we allow for changing styles and
strategies during the process of annual negotiations on incomes
policy. As a result we have 12 (4 3) possible situations that
characterize these negotiations in relation to the outcome: a central
agreement is reached or not (see Table A1).
The necessary data were taken from both primary and secondary
sources. Primary sources for social partners included their annual
notes with which they entered negotiations. The government’s
policies and interventions are documented in the annual budget
and related government notes and parliamentary debates. All
these documents, plus accompanying actions, have been more or
less extensively reported in the Bulletin of the Social and Economic
Council (SER), which has served as an important source for the
research. Additionally, a comprehensive literature on (the history
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of various aspects of) Dutch corporatism, wage bargaining and
incomes policy was studied (for an extensive elaboration, see
Woldendorp, 2005: 46–77; 276–8; and for the reconstruction of all
36 rounds of negotiations, Woldendorp, 2005: 278–355).
Government strategies and styles of decision-making each repre-
sent a certain rank order of possible strategic behaviour (ordinal
scale): strategies of government intervention (but not of corporat-
ism) and styles of decision-making of cooperation between social
partners. However, the combinations of both represent nominal
categories that are used to classify their behaviour. Furthermore,
tests (chi-square) based on cross-tabulations of both opening and
concluding government strategies and styles of decision-making
indicate that there is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship. There-
fore, we decided to present the research in a descriptive-analytical
fashion, identifying and elaborating meaningful clusters of beha-
viour and outcome (central agreement or not) in relation to speciﬁc
periods or circumstances.
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TABLE A1
Actors’ Strategic Behaviour, Social Democracy in Ofﬁce and Central Agreements
1965–2000
Year Opening
Government
Strategy and
Style of
Decision-Making
Concluding
Government
Strategy and
Style of
Decision-Making
Social
Democracy in
Coalition
Government
Central
Agreement on
Incomes
Policy
1965 IIIA IIIB Out Yes
1966 IB IVB In No
1967 IVB IVB Out No
1968 IVB IB Out No
1969 IVA IVA Out No
1970 IIC IVC Out Yes
1971 IVB IA Out No
1972 IIB IA Out No
1973 IIB IIA Out No
1974 IIA IVB In No
1975 IIB IIB In No
1976 IIA IVB In No
1977 IIB IIB In Yes
1978 IIA IIB In No
1979 IVA IIA Out No
continued on next page
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Notes
1. The Dutch Disease is commonly characterized by a vicious circle of increasing
unemployment and rapidly rising social security transfers, leading to deﬁcit spending
and an increasing public debt (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; Andeweg, 2000; Delsen,
2002).
2. The DutchMiracle is commonly characterized by a virtuous circle of job growth,
resulting in low unemployment and reduced social security transfers, leading to
balanced budgets and a decreasing public debt (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997;
Andeweg, 2000; Delsen, 2002).
3. The policy agreement on incomes policy: bipartite: between trade unions and
employers’ organizations; tripartite: between social partners and the government.
4. EMU criteria included a public debt of not more than 60 percent of GDP; an
annual budget deﬁcit of not more than 3 percent of GDP; and an inﬂation close to
the EU average.
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TABLE A1
Continued
Year Opening
Government
Strategy and
Style of
Decision-Making
Concluding
Government
Strategy and
Style of
Decision-Making
Social
Democracy in
Coalition
Government
Central
Agreement on
Incomes
Policy
1980 IIB IVB Out No
1981 IIIA IVA Out No
1982 IB IVB Out No
1983 IIIA IC Out Yes
1984 IC IC Out Yes
1985 IVB IB Out No
1986 IA IA Out No
1987 IIB IIIB Out Yes
1988 IIA IIA Out No
1989 IIB IIB Out No
1990 IIIC IIIB In Yes
1991 IVA IIB In Yes
1992 IA IA In No
1993 IIIB IIIB In Yes
1994 IVA IIC In Yes
1995 IIA IIA In – dominant No
1996 IIB IIB In – dominant Yes
1997 IIB IIB In – dominant Yes
1998 IIB IIB In – dominant Yes
1999 IIIB IIIC In – dominant Yes
2000 IIB IIB In – dominant No
Sources: Woldendorp et al. (2000: 394 ff.); Woldendorp (2005: 274–355).
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5. Note that in our analysis of Dutch corporatism, the PolderModel variety of cor-
poratist government strategies (II and III) and style of decision-making (C) represents
only part of the possible range of combinations of strategic behaviour of party
government and social partners within the Dutch institutional framework of labour
relations. But here we investigate whether or not we can identify a speciﬁc phenom-
enon that is broadly discussed in the literature on Dutch corporatism: the Polder
Model.
6. In the Appendix we report the opening and concluding strategies and styles of
decision-making. These refer to the ﬁrst bid in the annual round of negotiations
and the subsequent changes during the process.
7. Meaning free from the government interference that was customary in the era of
the centralized, government-directed incomes policy between 1945 and 1965 (Wind-
muller, 1969).
8. The linkage came into force in 1974 with the policy package of the government
Den Uyl (PvdA). Wages, beneﬁts and pensions in the (semi-) public sector became
linked to the statutory minimum wage (1969) and to the average rise in collectively
agreed wages in the market sector. In 1979, this linkage became statutory (the Law
on Adjustment Mechanisms). Consequently, incomes policy in the market sector
had a direct effect on incomes in the (semi-) public sector and on the government’s
budget (deﬁcit). From 1983, the linkage was put on hold; since 1992 it has been
conditional (Law on Conditional Indexation) (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997: 132ff.).
9. Central negotiations between social partners are conducted within the frame-
work of the Law on Wage Formation of 1970/1986. The law of 1970 marks the
legal transition from a government-guided incomes policy to free negotiations,
although government reserved the authority to intervene in these negotiations.
From 1987, only a ‘national emergency, caused by ‘‘external’ factors’’ ’ can serve as
a legitimate cause for government intervention with general binding measures in
incomes policy (Korver, 1993: 394).
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